Some Epstein file redactions are being undone with hacks
(theguardian.com)677 points by vinni2 18 hours ago
677 points by vinni2 18 hours ago
The journalist writing the story has the same level of technical knowledge about how to "redact" properly in the digital realm as the individuals doing the redaction. To the journalist, with zero knowledge of the technical aspects, viewing the "redacted" document, it appears to be "redacted", so when someone "unredacts" it, the action of revealing the otherwise hidden material appears to be "magical" to them (in the vein of the Arthur C Clarke quote of: "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic").
To the journalist, it looks like "hackers at work" because the result looks like magic. Therefore their editor attaching "hacks" to the title for additional clickbait as well.
To us technical people, who understand the concept of layers in digital editing, it is no big deal at all (and is not surprising that some percentage of the PDF's have been processed this way).
I would consider it gross negligence on the journalists part to not know the technical details here.
It’s really not that hard; as someone else on this thread pointed out even my grandma knows this…
You can find out the technical details in one quick search.
How someone like this gets a paying job as a journalist is beyond me.
>How someone like this gets a paying job as a journalist is beyond me.
You seem highly confused on what a journalists job is in this era. Very few publishers are about correctness. It's about speed of getting the article out and getting as many eyeballs as possible to look at the ads in the article.
Or as the saying goes, A lie can travel halfway around the world before the truth can get its boots on.
To us, it's a life skill. To a non-technical person, it's black magic.
Some folks had to be taught on how folder structures work because they grew up with the appliance we called a "phone" as opposed to a real computer that also happened to be known as a "phone".
I can assure you that plenty of people who were using computers before smartphones, and who have used them every day at work for decades, also do not grasp what we could consider the very basics of file management.
Most journalists are ex. English majors (or some other non-technical degree). I would not expect any (even the supposed tech. journalists) to understand the technology they report upon to the level that us here on HN understand that same technology.
Their job is to write coherent articles that gather views, not truly understand what it is they are writing about. That's why the Gell-Mann Amnesia [1] aspect so often crops up for any technical article (hint, it also crops up for every article, but we don't recognize the mistakes the journalist makes in the articles where we don't have the underlying knowledge to recognize the mistakes).
No, it is not. But given the abysmal lack of technical knowledge of the "typical computer user" they don't see the redacted PDF's as "having black stick-it notes stuck on top of the text". They see the PDF as having had a "black marker pen" applied that has obliterated the text from view.
When someone then shows them how to copy/paste out the original text, because the PDF was simply black stick-it notes above the text, it appears to them as if that someone is a magical wizard of infinite intelligence.
As far as creating a click bait title, yep, the editor knows what they are doing, and most likely picked the word for the click bait factor.
But I'd also bet the editors technical knowledge of how this "revelation" of the hidden material really works is low enough that it also appears to be magic to them as well. So they likely think it is a 'hack' as well.
This. Similar issue if you introduce someone to how you can "view source" and then edit (your view of) a website. They're like "omg haxors!"
True story: one time I used that technique to ask for a higher credit card limit than the options the website presented. Interestingly enough, they handled it gracefully by sending me a rejection for a higher amount and an acceptance for the maximum offered amount (the one I edited). And I didn't get arrested for hacking!
> "view source" and then edit (your view of) a website.
Yes, but you see it says "view source" not "edit page live". Don't really see why it wouldn't be "omg" for them.
I also like to think this was maybe done as a form of malicious compliance. Someone inside the agency was tasked with redacting this, and found a way to sneak the information through but still getting it passed by their supervisors, so that the information got out.
It reminds me of the 2008 Underhanded C code contest. The subject was exactly this.
https://www.underhanded-c.org/_page_id_17.html
And the winner's solution is incredibly simple and clever.
To me this is the only explanation that makes sense. However wouldn’t they risk repercussions when this is inevitably found out? I assume they have records who redacted which documents
Yes they may get fired, but it will be difficult to prove intent and very easy to claim incompetence.
So I don’t think there will be jail time if that’s what you’re referring to.
Furthermore, this happens so often, so frequently, in so many high profile cases that even my 80 year old mother knows this "secret hack to unredact a pdf".
If you are CIA / FBI / Court / Lawyer or professional full time redactor of documents you should know that the highlighter doesn't delete the text underneath it.
They're likely viewing the electronic documents by analogy to photocopies with blacked out sections where there is nothing to distinguish the text from the redacting marks and nothing you can project out. They don't know the structure of the file format and how information in it is encoded or rendered, or even that there is a distinction between encoding and rendering.
(A better analogy might be the original physical document with redaction marks. If the text is printed using a laser printer or a type writer, and the marker used for redaction uses some other kind of ink - let's say one that doesn't dissolve the text's ink or toner in any way - then you can in principle distinguish between the two and thus recover visibility of the text.)
How about "the documents were clarified" or "their contents were revealed"? Maybe "formatted for reading on your device"?
Here on the hacking news website we sure are persnickety about the difference.
The U.S. federal government is bad at redactions on purpose.
The offices responsible for redactions are usually in-house legal shops (e.g., an Office of Chief Counsel inside an agency like CBP) and the agency’s FOIA office. They’re often doing redactions manually in Adobe, which is slow, tedious, and error-prone. Because the process is error prone, the federal government gets multiple layers of review, justified (as DOJ lawyers regularly tell courts) by the need to “protect the information of innocent U.S. citizens.”
But the “bad at redactions” part isn’t an accident. It functions as a litigation tactic. Makes production slow, make FOIA responses slow, and then point to that slow, manual process as the reason the timeline has to be slow. The government could easily buy the kind of redaction tools that most law firms have used for decades. Purpose built redaction tools speed the work up and reduce mistakes. But the government doesn't buy those tools because faster, cleaner production benefits the requester.
The downside for the government is that every so often a judge gets fed up and orders a normal timeline. Then agencies go into panic mode and initiate an “all hands on deck.” Then you end up with untrained, non-attorney staff doing rushed redactions by hand in Adobe. Some of them can barely use a mouse. That’s when you see the classic technical failures: someone draws a black rectangle that looks like a redaction, instead of applying a real redaction that actually removes the underlying text.
Befuddling that this happened again. It’s not the first time
- Paul Manafort court filing (U.S., 2019) Manafort’s lawyers filed a PDF where the “redacted” parts were basically black highlighting/boxes over live text. Reporters could recover the hidden text (e.g., via copy/paste).
- TSA “Standard Operating Procedures” manual (U.S., 2009) A publicly posted TSA screening document used black rectangles that did not remove the underlying text; the concealed content could be extracted. This led to extensive discussion and an Inspector General review.
- UK Ministry of Defence submarine security document (UK, 2011) A MoD report had “redacted” sections that could be revealed by copying/pasting the “blacked out” text—because the text was still present, just visually obscured.
- Apple v. Samsung ruling (U.S., 2011) A federal judge’s opinion attempted to redact passages, but the content was still recoverable due to the way the PDF was formatted; copying text out revealed the “redacted” parts.
- Associated Press + Facebook valuation estimate in court transcript (U.S., 2009) The AP reported it could read “redacted” portions of a court transcript by cut-and-paste (classic overlay-style failure). Secondary coverage notes the mechanism explicitly.
A broader “history of failures” compilation (multiple orgs / years) The PDF Association collected multiple incidents (including several above) and describes the common failure mode: black shapes drawn over text without deleting/sanitizing the underlying content. https://pdfa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/High-Security-PD...
Indeed, incompetence is basically guaranteed if the organization selects for allegiance rather than competence. But I prefer to think that at least part of this was malicious compliance, because that suggests that at least some people at the FBI still have their soul.
Since hundreds of people were involved the most likely explanation is incompetence
Having lots of people involved means that it's more likely to be malicious compliance or deniable sabotage. It only needs one person who disagrees with the redactions to start doing things that they know will allow info to leak.
> Since hundreds of people were involved the most likely explanation is incompetence
Hundreds of people might be involved, but the only key factor required for a single point of failure to propagate to the deliverable is lack of verification.
And God knows how the Trump administration is packed with inexperiente incompetents assigned to positions where they are way way over their head, and routinely commit the most basic mistakes.
Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity
Not to mention when the White House published Obama's birth certificate as a PDF. I remember being able to open it and turn the different layers off and on.
> - Associated Press + Facebook valuation estimate in court transcript (U.S., 2009) The AP reported it could read “redacted” portions of a court transcript by cut-and-paste (classic overlay-style failure). Secondary coverage notes the mechanism explicitly.
What happens in a court case when this occurs? Does the receiving party get to review and use the redacted information (assuming it’s not gagged by other means) or do they have to immediately report the error and clean room it?
Edit: after reading up on this it looks like attorneys have strict ethical standards to not use the information (for what little that may be worth), but the Associated Press was a third party who unredacted public court documents in a separate Facebook case.
> What happens in a court case when this occurs? Does the receiving party get to review and use the redacted information (assuming it’s not gagged by other means) or do they have to immediately report the error and clean room it?
Typically, two copies of a redacted document are submitted via ECF. One is an unredacted but sealed copy that is visible to the judge and all parties to the case. The other is a redacted copy that is visible to the general public.
So, to answer what I believe to be your question: the opposing party in a case would typically have an unredacted copy regardless of whether information is leaked to the general public via improper redaction, so the issue you raise is moot.
My guess would be that if the benefitting legal party didn't need to declare they also benefitted from this (because they legally can't be caught, etc.) they wouldn't.
I know and am friends with a lot of lawyers. They're pretty ruthless when it comes to this kind of thing.
Legally, I would think both parties get copies of everything. I don't know if that was the case here.
> strict ethical standards to not use the information (for what little that may be worth)
If it's worth so little to your eyes/comprehension you will have no problem citing a huge count of cases where lawyers do not respect their obligations towards the courts and their clients...
That snide remark is used to discredit a profession in passing, but the reason you won't find a lot of examples of this happening is because the trust clients have to put in lawyers and the legal system in general is what makes it work, and betraying that trust is a literal professional suicide (suspension, disbarment, reputational ruin, and often civil liability) for any lawyer... that's why "strict" doesn't mean anything "little" in this case.
Well, also the lawyer would have to really badly fuck up for it to become public news that they had actually used the information.
> Edit: after reading up on this it looks like attorneys have strict ethical standards to not use the information (for what little that may be worth), but the Associated Press was a third party who unredacted public court documents in a separate Facebook case.
Curious. I am not a litigator but this is surprising if you found support for it. My gut was that the general obligation to be a zealous advocate for your client would require a litigant to use inadvertently disclosed information unless it was somehow barred by the court. Confidentiality obligations would remain owed to the client, and there might be some tension there but it would be resolvable.
I’m unclear why this is downvoted given the below. While it would theoretically be jurisdiction-specific, if the ABA model rules don’t provide some specific guidance, it’s clear that the lawyers would be ethically obligated to use whatever info they obtained if it helped their client and as otherwise consistent with their ethical obligations in the jurisdictions that follow those. I’m admitted in New York, and I don’t recall any kind of bar on the usage of this type of info. Seems like in a lot of jurisdictions they’d have a duty to notify, but that may not even be the case in all.
My recollection is that it varies quite a bit between jurisdictions. The ABA's model rules require you to notify the other party when they accidentally send you something but leave unspecified what else, if anything, you might have to do.
A famous case where this came into play was one of the Infowars defamation suits. Alex Jones’s lawyer accidentally sent the families’ lawyer the full contents of a phone backup. They notified Jones’s lawyer, and gave him some time to reply. After that time elapsed, the whole dump was considered fair game.
This is the moment when that mistake was revealed in court: https://youtu.be/pgxZSBfGXUM and this is the hearing for the emergency motion to suppress that data: https://youtu.be/dKbAmNwbiMk
I am happy with their lack of expertise and hope it stays that way, because I cannot remember a single case where redactions put the citizenry at a better place for it.
Of course if it's in the middle of an investigation it can spoil the investigation, allow criminals to cover their tracks, allow escape.
In such case the document should be vetted by competent and honest officials to judge whether it is timely to release it, or whether suppressing it just ensures that investigation is never concluded, extending a forever renewed cover to the criminals.
there are FOIA lawsuits seeking the redaction training videos, one by https://bsky.app/profile/muellershewrote.com so maybe one day we will know more.
Of course there is a process.
There was also a process on how to communicate top secret information, but these idiots prefered to use signal.
I'm completly lost on how you can be surprised by this at all? Trump is in there, tells some FBI faboon to black everything out, they collect a group of people they can find and start going through these files as fast as they can.
"When a clown moves into a palace, he doesn't become a king; the palace instead becomes a circus."
"There are major differences between the Trump 1.0 and 2.0 administrations. In the Trump 1.0 administration, many of the most important officials were very competent men. One example would be then-Attorney General William Barr. Barr is contemptible, yes, but smart AF. When Barr’s DOJ released a redacted version of the Mueller Report, they printed the whole thing, made their redactions with actual ink, and then re-scanned every page to generate a new PDF with absolutely no digital trace of the original PDF file. There are ways to properly redact a PDF digitally, but going analog is foolproof.
The Trump 2.0 administration, in contrast, is staffed top to bottom with fools."
https://daringfireball.net/linked/2025/12/23/trump-doj-pdf-r...
> made their redactions with actual ink, and then re-scanned every page
That's not very competent.
> going analog is foolproof
Absolutely not. There are many way's to f this up. Just the smallest variation in places that have been inked twice will reveal the clear text.
> Just the smallest variation in places that have been inked twice will reveal the clear text
Sure. But anyone can visually examine this. That means everyone with situational context can directly examine the quality of the redaction.
Contrast that with a digital redation. You have to trust the tool works. Or you have to separate the folks with context from the folks with techical competence. (There is the third option of training everyone in the DoJ how to examine the inner workings of a PDF. That seems wasteful.)
I suppose the best process would be this, and then after rescanning putting a black bar over each redacted text with image editing.
It's not fool proof:
https://www.theverge.com/2023/6/28/23777298/sony-ftc-microso...
It's like Russian spies being caught in the Netherlands with taxi receipts showing they took a taxi from their Moscow HQ to the airport: corrupt organizations attract/can only hire incompetent people...
https://www.vice.com/en/article/russian-spies-chemical-weapo...
Anyone remember how the Trump I regime had staff who couldn't figure out the lighting in the White House, or mistitled Australia's Prime Minister as President?
Yes I remember that incident. It was big over here.
However I'm 100% sure that that was not a real spy incident. But rather just a 'message' to be sent from the Russian govt. The same way they have infiltrated our airspace with TU-95 bombers nearly every month for decades. Just a message "Hey we are still watching you".
When you see how ridiculously incompetent they were, not just their phone history but also the gear they had with them. It amounts to nothing more than a scriptkiddy's pineapple. There's no way they would have been able to do any serious infiltration into any kind of even remotely competent organisation.
Also the visible fumbling about in a carpark with overly complex antennas instead of something more hidden (e.g. an apartment across the street, a cabling tent or something). IMO the objective here was to get caught and stir a fuss.
> with taxi receipts
Please tell me they were saving them for expensing.
Or the passports discovered intact after a particularly heinous terrorist attack.
The bigger difference from my perspective is that they have competent people doing the strategy this time. The last Trump administration failed to use the obvious levers available to accomplish fascism, while this one has been wildly successful on that end. In a few years they will have realigned the whole power dynamic in the country, and unfortunately more and more competent people will choose to work for them in order to receive the benefits of doing so.
His last administration was filled with traditional Republicans.
I may have disagreed with them on virtually every policy point, but they seemed to disagree with the most harmful Trump policies as well.
We would have never agreed on the right policy, but we definitely agreed that his policy was not the right one.
> they have competent people doing the strategy this time
They had a great playbook in Project 2025. I'm not convinced Trump ever had the smartest people executing it.
> Had exactly did Barr and Co. accomplish in terms of moving forward the agenda people voted for? These guys were so eager to win accolades from liberals they couldn’t even pick the lowest hanging fruit.
Are you talking about the same Bill Barr? "Eager to win accolades from liberals" is a hilariously Trump-after-he-fired-someone thing to say.
Have you read his Wikipedia page? Do you know who he actually is?
> You mean the guy who covered up for Epstein's 'suicide' and expected us morons to believe it?
Let's assume that's true. How does it clash with him being "contemptible...but smart AF"?
Yeah I mean, orchestrating an assassination in a federal prison of a guy the whole world is watching, and never even so much as a whiff of a leak? Because how do you contain that without whacking everyone involved (which we would know about)? You don't. Not without teleportation, time-travel, or at the very least post-hypnotic suggestion.
Oh he's smart AF, all right.
> but smart AF. When Barr’s DOJ released a redacted version of the Mueller Report, they printed the whole thing, made their redactions with actual ink, and then re-scanned every page to generate a new PDF with absolutely no digital trace of the original PDF file.
This is a dumb way of doing that, exactly what "stupid" people do when their are somewhat aware of the limits of their competence or only as smart as the tech they grew up with. Also, this type of redaction eliminates the possibility to change text length, which is a very common leak when especially for various names/official positions. And it doesn't eliminate the risk of non-redaction since you can't simply search&replace with machine precision, but have to do the manual conversion step to printed position
> This is a dumb way of doing that, exactly what "stupid" people do when their are somewhat aware of the limits of their competence or only as smart as the tech they grew up with.
No, this is an example of someone understanding the limits of the people they delegate to, and putting in a process so that delegation to even a very dumb person still has successful outcomes.
"Smart" people like to believe that knowing enough minutiae is enough to result in a successful outcome.
Actual smart people know that the process is more important than the minutiae, and proceed accordingly.
> someone understanding the limits of the people they delegate to, and putting in a process so that delegation to even a very dumb person still has successful
Oh, man, is he the only smart person in the whole department of >100k employees and an >x contractors??? What other fantasy do you need to believe in to excuse the flaws? Also, if he's so smart why didn't he, you know, hire someone smart for the job?
> even a very dumb person still has successful
Except it's easier to make mistakes following his process for both smart and dumb people, not be successful!
> Actual smart people know that the process is more important
So he's not actually smart according to your own definition because the process he has set up was bad, so he apparently did not know it was important to set it up better?
> important than the minutiae
Demanding only paper redactions is that minutiae.
Not at all. It's a procedure that's very difficult to unintentionally screw up. Sometimes that's what you want.
> you can't simply search&replace with machine precision
Sure you can. Search and somehow mark the text (underline or similar) to make keywords hard to miss. Then proceed with the manual print, expunge, scan process.
> this type of redaction eliminates the possibility to change text length
This is the only weakness of Barr's method.
> it doesn't eliminate the risk of non-redaction since you can't simply search&replace with machine precision
Anyong relying on automated tools to redact is doing so performatively. At the end of the day, you need people who understand the context to sit down and read through the documents and strike out anything that reveals–directly or indirectly, spelled correctly or incorrectly–too much.
> this type of redaction eliminates the possibility to change text length, which is a very common leak when especially for various names/official positions
Increasing the size of the redaction box to include enough of the surrounding text to make that very difficult.
FTC vs Microsoft: https://www.theverge.com/2023/6/28/23777298/sony-ftc-microso...
Also the pedophile that tried to obscure his face in pictures with a swirl effect that they were able to reverse enough to identify him:
https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2007/11/you-can-swi...
IIRC there was a Slashdot discussion about it that went "Oh yeah, obviously you need to black out the face entirely, or use a randomized Gaussian blur." "Yeah, or just not molest kids."
Given the context and the baldly political direction behind the redactions, it's not at all unlikely that this is the result of deliberate sabotage or malicious compliance. Bondi isn't blacking these things out herself, she's ordering people to do it who aren't true believers. Purges take time (and often blood). She's stuck with the staff trained under previous administrations.
You mean the layers that were, in fact, just side effects of scanning the (non-authoritative) short form certificate?
It's funny seeing this play out because in my personal life anytime I'm sharing a sensitive document where someone needs to see part of it but I don't want them to see the rest that's not relevant, I'll first block out/redact the text I don't want them to see (covering it, using a redacting highlighter thing, etc.), and then I'll screenshot the page and make that image a PDF.
I always felt paranoid (without any real evidence, just a guess) that there would always be a chance that anything done in software could be reversed somehow.
If it's not done properly, and you happen at any point in the chain to put black blocks on a compressed image (and PDF do compress internal images), you are leaking some bits of information in the shadow casted by the compression algorithm : (Self-plug : https://github.com/unrealwill/jpguncrop )
And that's just in the non-adversarial simple case.
If you don't know the provenance of images you are putting black box on (for example because of a rogue employee intentionally wanting to leak them, or if the image sensor of your target had been compromised to leak some info by another team), your redaction can be rendered ineffective, as some images can be made uncroppable by construction .
(Self-plug : https://github.com/unrealwill/uncroppable )
And also be aware that compression is hiding everywhere : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compressed_sensing
Right, using stenography to encode some parity bits into an image so that lost information can be reconstructed seems like an obvious approach - all sorts of approaches you could use, akin to FEC. Haven't looked at your site yet, will be interested to see what you've built :)
Edit: I checked it out, nice, I like the lower res stenography approach, can work very nicely with good upscaling filters - gave it a star :)
>Let's crop it anyway
That is not cropping.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cropping_(image)
>Cropping is the removal of unwanted _outer_ areas from a photographic or illustrated image.
Please forgive my outside the box use of word.
I used it at the time as a reference to the "PNG aCropalypse" ( https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35208721 where I originally shared it in a comment).
The algorithm does also work if you remove the outer areas of the photo.
Somewhat related, I once sent a FOI request to a government agency that decided the most secure way to redact documents was to print them, use a permanent marker, and then scan them. Unfortunately they used dye based markers over laser print, so simply throwing the document into Photoshop and turning up the contrast made it readable.
I remember noticing that a teacher in high school had used white-out to hide the marks for the correct multiple choice answer on final exam practice questions before copying them. Then she literally cut-and-pasted questions from the practice questions for the final. I did mediocre on the essay, but got the highest score in the class on the multiple choice questions, because I could see little black dots where the white out was used.
I was thinking I understand what's going on but then I came to the image showing the diff and I don't understand at all how that diff can unredact anything.
It's not that you can unredact them from scratch (you could never get the blue circle back from this software). It's that you can tell which of the redacted images is which of the origin images. Investigative teams often find themselves in a situation where they have all four images, but need to work out which redacted files are which of the origins. Take for example, where headed paper is otherwise entirely redacted.
So with this technique, you can definitively say "Redacted-file-A is definitely a redacted version of Origin-file-A". Super useful for identifying forgeries in a stack of otherwise legitimate files.
Also good for for saying "the date on origin-file-B is 1993, and the file you've presented as evidence is provable as origin-file-b, so you definitely know of [whatever event] in 1993".
I'll just send an image and not bother with a PDF.
(Note there's also other metadata in a PDF, which you may not want your recipient to know either.)
There's also metadata in the image files. What specifically would be sensitive in the pdf with screenshots metadata that is also not present in the sceenshot image metadata?
PDF has something called an "info dictionary", which most mainstream PDF-writing software will fill out with various bits of info that you might not want known.
Image files usually have substantially less metadata by default, unless it's one taken by a camera.
I learned that a long time ago when I was a student and wanted to submit a pdf generated by a trial version of some software as an assignment and was trying to be clever and cover the watermark that said unregistered with a white box.
When opening the file in my slow computer, I could see all the rendering of the watermark happening in slow motion until the white box would pop up on top of the text.
When I was a student, and using a shareware or trial version of some software and wanted some printed output from it without a watermark, I printed to postscript (chose a printer that supported postscript and the driver used it instead of rasterized images), but using a file instead of a printer.
I could then open up the postscript, delete the commands that rendered the watermark, save it, then I converted it to PDF so it would be easy to print.
It's actually quite easy to open the pdf and see that there are several different elements per page to the document, eg the main text, an image, the footer, the title.
Randomly removing these by trial and error will usually quite easily allow you to find the watermark and nix it, with the advantage that even a sophisticated recipient will not be able to find out from the pdf file what the watermark was.
it's absolutely bewildering how ridiculous everything has been so far in terms of competence and this really takes the cherry on the top near Christmas too.
how much lower can they go ?!
USA is still very high, so they can go much much lower, but I think they might go to some still lower places, finding them where we didn't even know such places could exist. Some ideas:
- Leave NATO
- Start openly supporting Russia and North Korea
- Arrest whole International Criminal Court
- Preventively invade China
Reintroduce witch burning.
Reintroduce death penalties on public squares.
Taking Greenland and Venezuela is given, as they took most of Latin America already. Just the new Mexican president looks like the next thorn in their eyes. Too competent, too social, too anti-corruption.
Support for NATO within the US is Isreal-lite for different demographics. Pouring resources into it isn't without downsides.
They effectively already left NATO and openly support Russia already. ICC members are already under fire and some had their microsoft account banned by Trump. Trump will invade Greenland and Canada first. China is less of an priority.
This low https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Child_abuse_in_Pakistan aka a society where child abuse is simply accepted and mainstream, with the child abuse of child labour and dhijhadism being just additional nightmare fuel on top.
If we survive long enough I do believe historians will look back on this period and state as a matter of fact, rape and child abuse were completely acceptable, because it seems it’s totally fine with our elected leaders. If these leaders were democratically elected there is only one conclusion to draw from it…
Maybe it was always part of the plan. Plausible Deniability.
This is what I do while sharing such images. I crop out those parts first and then take another screenshot. I do not even risk painting over and then take another screenshot. I have been doing this forever.
That seems like a dangerous approach. Though printer drivers do often use rasterization, especially when targeting cheap printers, many printers can render vector graphics and text as well. Print-to-PDF will often use the later approach, unless of course the source program always rasterizes it's output when sending it out to the printer driver, or the used Print-to-PDF driver is particularly stupid.
I then convert the image to grayscale only. Then I apply a filter so that only 16 colors are used. And I then adjust brightness/contrast so that "white is really white". It's all scripted: "screenshot to PDF". One of my oldest shell script.
16 shades of grey (not 50) is plenty enough for text to still be smooth.
I do it for several reasons, one of them being I often take manual notes on official documents (which infuriates my wife btw) but then sometimes I need to then scan the documents and send them (local IRS / notary / bank / whatever). So I'll just scan then I'll fill rectangle with white where I took handnotes. Another reason is when there's paper printed on two sides, at scan times sometimes if the paper is thin / ink is thick, the other side shall show.
I wonder how that'd work vs adversarial inputs: never really thought about it.
"Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake" - Napoleon Bonaparte
Let all the files get released first.
Then show your hacks.
They're not 'hacks' it's the people doing the redaction making beginner mistakes of not properly removing the selectable text under the redactions. They're either drawing black rectangles over the text or highlighting it black neither of which prevents the underlying text from being selected.
Keeping that secret would require sponaneous silence from everyone looking at these docs which is just not possible.
This was my initial reaction to this news. I mean think about it
The Trump team knows that nobody is gonna buy whatever they put out as being the full story. Isn't this just the perfect way to make people feel like they got something they weren't supposed to see? They can increase trust in the output without having to increase trust in the source of it
And as far as I've heard there hasn't been anything "unredacted" that's been of any consequence. It all just feels a little too perfect.
It's the same government that invited a journalist to a signal discussion about ongoing military strike in Yemen.
No, it's the opposite, it's fairly damaging. Previously they could claim, dubiously but plausible, that all redactions were about protecting victims (the only redactions allowed under the act). A lot of the "undone redactions" are solely about protecting the abusers, illegal under the law.
Whether breaking a law actually matters anymore is another question though, as crime is legal now.
That was my thought. Just happen to leak some info for people you are interested in hurting but claim it was an accident.
And in terms of no big news in “unredacted”, it’s likely names that don’t mean anything to the average voter but damaging material for K Street.
It sets a bad precedent to call things like this hacks.
Firstly, calling this redaction implies that the data is missing, and calling what was done "unredacting" is akin to saying someone "decrypted" a cryptographic hash function.
Nobody unredacted anything here, they merely discovered that it hadn't been redacted, and simply looked like it was redacted.
Calling this a hack places responsibility on the people who discovered the information, rather than on the people were put in charge of handling the redaction and screwed it up.