Comment by adrian_b

Comment by adrian_b 3 days ago

5 replies

The set of values of any physical quantity must have an algebraic structure that satisfies a set of axioms that include the axioms of the Archimedean group (which include the requirements that it must be possible to compare, add and subtract the values of that physical quantity).

This requirement is necessary to allow the definition of a division operation, which has as operands a pair of values of that physical quantity, and as result a scalar a.k.a. "real" number. This division operation, as you have noticed, is called "measurement" of that physical quantity. A value of some physical quantity, i.e. the dividend in the measurement operation, is specified by writing the quotient and the divisor of the measurement, e.g. in "6 inches", "6" is the quotient and "inch" is the divisor.

In principle, this kind of division operation, like any division, could have its digit-generating steps executed infinitely, producing an approximation as close as desired for the value of the measured quantity, which is supposed to be an arbitrary scalar, a.k.a. "real" number. Halting the division after a finite number of steps will produce a rational number.

In practice, as you have described, the desire to execute the division in a finite time is not the only thing that limits the precision of the measured values, but there are many more constraints, caused by the noise that could need longer and longer times to be filtered, by external influences that become harder and harder to be suppressed or accounted for, by ever greater cost of the components of the measurement apparatus, by the growing energy required to perform the measurement, and so on.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the results of all practical measurements are rational numbers of low precision, normally representable as FP32, with only measurements done in a few laboratories around the world, which use extremely expensive equipment, requiring an FP64 or an extended precision representation, it is still preferable to model the set of scalars using the traditional axioms of the continuous straight line, i.e. of the "real" numbers.

The reason is that this mathematical model of a continuous set is actually much simpler than attempting to model the sets of values of physical quantities as discrete sets. An obvious reason why the continuous model is simpler is that you cannot find discretization steps that are good both for the side and for the diagonal of a square, which has stopped the attempts of the Ancient Greeks to describe all quantities as discrete. Already Aristotle was making a clear distinction between discrete quantities and continuous quantities. Working around the Ancient Greek paradox requires lack of isotropy of the space, i.e. discretization also of the angles, which brings a lot of complications, e.g. things like rigid squares or circles cannot exist.

The base continuous dynamical quantities are the space and time, together with a third quantity, which today is really the electric voltage (because of the convenient existence of the Josephson voltage-frequency converters), even if the documents of the International System of Units are written in an obfuscated way that hides this, in an attempt to preserve the illusion that the mass might be a base quantity, like in the older systems of units.

In any theory where some physical quantities that are now modeled as continuous, were modeled as discrete instead, the space and time would also be discrete. There have been many attempts to model the space-time as a discrete lattice, but none of them has produced any useful result. Unless something revolutionary will be discovered, all such attempts appear to be just a big waste of time.

btilly 3 days ago

Your first paragraph is contradicted by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.

  • adrian_b 3 days ago

    The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is completely irrelevant for metrology and it certainly does not have any relationship whatsoever with the algebraic structure of the set of values of a physical quantity.

    The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is just a trivial consequence of the properties of the Fourier transform. It just states that there are certain pairs of physical quantities which are not independent (because their probability densities are connected by a Fourier transform relationship), so measuring both simultaneously with an arbitrary precision is not possible.

    The Heisenberg uncertainty principle says absolutely nothing about the measurement of a single physical quantity or about the simultaneous measurement of a pair of independent physical quantities.

    There is no such thing as a quantity that cannot be measured, i.e. the set of its values does not have the required Archimedean group algebraic structure. If it cannot be measured, it is not a quantity (there are also qualities, which can only be compared, but not measured, so the sets of their values are only ordered sets, not Archimedean groups; an example of a physical quality, which is not a physical quantity, is the Mohs hardness, whose numeric values are just labels attached to certain values, a Mohs hardness of "3" could have been as well labeled as "Ktcwy" or with any other arbitrary string, the numeric labels have been chosen only to remember easy the order between them).

    • btilly 3 days ago

      The Heisenberg uncertainty principle says that basic physical quantities do not have unique values. They have ranges of values. And therefore it is not always possible to compare two physical properties. For example you can't always compare two particles to discover which is farther away from you.

      Various proposals exist in which the fundamental physical structure of space form a kind of "quantum foam". And so, somewhere near the Planck length, it doesn't even make sense to talk about distance.

      • adrian_b 3 days ago

        I am sorry, but you have forgotten what the Heisenberg uncertainty principle really says.

        What you have in mind about "ranges of values" has nothing to do with Heisenberg, but with the formalism of quantum mechanics as developed by Schroedinger, Dirac and others (not counting the matrix mechanics of Heisenberg, which was an inferior mathematical method, soon forgotten after superior alternatives were developed, and which is something completely else than the Heisenberg principle of uncertainty).

        In the various variants of the formalism of quantum mechanics, the correspondent of a single value in classic dynamics is a function, the so-called wave function, but even those functions cannot be called "ranges of values". There are several interpretations of what the "wave" functions mean, but the most common is that they are probability densities for the values of the corresponding physical quantity.

        Depending on the context, in quantum mechanics the value of a physical quantity may be unknown, when only the probability of it having various values is known, but the value may also be known with absolute certainty, usually in some stationary states.

        In both cases the value of the physical quantity can be measured, but in the former only an average value can be measured, which nonetheless may have unlimited precision, while in the latter case the exact value can be measured, exactly like in classical dynamics.

        • btilly 2 days ago

          You are being unnecessariky rude. I have not forgotten what it says.

          There are pairs of physical properties, connected by a Fourier transform, that cannot both be known at once. Therefore each property is, in general, only known to be in a range. And therefore we cannot always compare these properties between different particles.

          As for measurement, in the Everett interpretation the values are not known after measurement either. All that is knowable are correlations due to entanglement.

          But now we are far afield. You made an a priori statement about physics. Physics is not required to oblige you. My understanding of physics says that it does not. But even if I am wrong, and it currently does oblige you, it is still not required to.

          A priori assertions do not have a good history. For an example, look at Kant's assertion that reality must be described by Euclidean geometry. He was not in a position to understand the ways in which he would prove to be wrong.