Comment by martinralbrecht

Push-to-Sync. We observed 8 apps employ a push-to-sync strat- egy to prevent privacy leakage to Google via FCM. In this mitigation strategy, apps send an empty (or almost empty) push notification to FCM. Some apps, such as Signal, send a push notification with no data (aside from the fields that Google sets; see Figure 4). Other apps may send an identifier (including, in some cases, a phone num- ber). This push notification tells the app to query the app server for data, the data is retrieved securely by the app, and then a push notification is populated on the client side with the unencrypted data. In these cases, the only metadata that FCM receives is that the user received some message or messages, and when that push noti- fication was issued. Achieving this requires sending an additional network request to the app server to fetch the data and keeping track of identifiers used to correlate the push notification received on the user device with the message on the app server.

Nothing changed, but many people struggle to understand their our own degree of relative ignorance and overvalue high-level details that are leaky abstractions which make the consequentially dissimilar look superficially similar.

Where in the document is that? Can you provide a page number or section title?

Even if your client is asking other clients to verify, what if everyone has the same wrong key for a particular user Whatsapp has chosen to spoof?

Well yeah. If they had solid evidence at the start, why would they need an investigation?

Wouldn't ratchet keys prevent MITM too? In other words if MITM has your keys and decrypts your message, then your keys are out of sync from now on. Or do I misunderstand that?

Or they could even take out the backdoor code and then put it back in after review.

Let’s be real: the standard is “Do we trust Meta?”

I don’t, and don’t see how it could possibly be construed to be logical to trust them.

I definitely trust a non-profit open source alternative a whole lot more. Perception can be different than reality but that’s what we’ve got to work with.

What you are saying is empirically false. Change in a single line of executed code (sometimes even a single character!) can be the difference between a secure and non-secure system.

This must mean that you have been paid not to understand these things. Or perhaps you would be punished at work if you internalized reality and spoke up. In either case, I don't think your personal emotional landscape should take precedence over things that have been proven and are trivial to demonstrate.

It sounds like your salary has depended on believing things like a partial audit is worthwhile in the case that a client is the actual adversary.

Well the thing is, the key exfiltration code would probably reside outside the TCB. Not particularly hard to have some function grab the signing keys, and send them to the server. Then you can impersonate as the user in MITM. That exfiltration is one-time and it's quite hard to recover from.

I'd much rather not have blind faith on WhatsApp doing the right thing, and instead just use Signal so I can verify myself it's key management is doing only what it should.

Speculating over the correctness of E2EE implementation isn't productive, considering the metadata leak we know Meta takes full advantage of, is enough reason to stick proper platforms like Signal.

The issue is what the client app does with the information after it is decrypted. As Snowden remarked after he released his trove, encryption works, and it's not like the NSA or anyone else has some super secret decoder ring. The problem is endpoint security is borderline atrocious and an obvious achilles heel - the information has to be decoded in order to display it to the end user, so that's a much easier attack vector than trying to break the encryption itself.

So the point other commenters are making is that you can verify all you want that the encryption is robust and secure, but that doesn't mean the app can't just send a copy of the info to a server somewhere after it has been decoded.