Comment by charcircuit
Comment by charcircuit 5 days ago
>are origin bound.
This is assuming the user's device is not compromised.
>How does that work?
Priviledge escalation on an old OS version allows an attacker to get root access. Then with that they can bypass any sandboxing. Or they could get access to some android permission intended for system apps that they should not have access to and use that to do malicous things.
I don't closely follow malware outbreaks for android so I can't point to specific examples, but malware does exist.
So the attacker compromises the user's device ... and then sets up a MitM? This is making about as much sense as the typical Hollywood plot that involves computers so I guess that means we're on track.
> Priviledge escalation on an old OS version allows an attacker to get root access.
At which point hardware attestation accomplishes nothing. Running in an enclave might but attesting the OS image that was used to boot most certainly won't.
Many consumers use older devices. Any banking app is forced to support them or they will lose customers. There's no way around that. (It doesn't matter anyway because these sorts of attacks simply aren't commonplace.)
> but malware does exist.
I didn't ask for an example of malware. I asked you to point to an example of a widespread attack against secured accounts using malware as a vector. You have invented some utterly unrealistic scenario that simply isn't a concern in the real world for a consumer banking interaction.
You're describing the sort of high effort targeted attack utilizing one or more zero days that a high level government official might be subject to.