Comment by jmclnx 5 days ago
So LP is or has left Microsoft ?
>We are building cryptographically verifiable integrity into Linux systems
I wonder what that means ? It could be a good thing, but I tend to think it could be a privacy nightmare depending on who controls the keys.
https://0pointer.net/blog/authenticated-boot-and-disk-encryp...
You. The money quote about the current state of Linux security:
> In fact, right now, your data is probably more secure if stored on current ChromeOS, Android, Windows or MacOS devices, than it is on typical Linux distributions.
Say what you want about systemd the project but they're the only ones moving foundational Linux security forward, no one else even has the ambition to try. The hardening tools they've brought to Linux are so far ahead of everything else it's not even funny.
This is basically propaganda for the war on general purpose computing. My user data is less safe on a Windows device, because Microsoft has full access to that device and they are extremely untrustworthy. On my Linux device, I choose the software to install.
What are you talking about? This has nothing to do with general purpose computing and everything to do with allowing you to authenticate the parts of the Linux boot process that must by necessity be left unencrypted in order to actually boot your computer. This is putting SecureBoot and the TPM to work for your benefit.
It's not propaganda in any sense, it's recognizing that Linux is behind the state of the art compared to Windows/macOS when it comes to preventing tampering with your OS install. It's not saying you should use Windows, it's saying we should improve the Linux boot process to be a tight security-wise as the Windows boot process along with a long explanation of how we get there.
> Microsoft
the guys that copy your bitlocker keys in the clear
Considering that (for example) your data on ChromeOS is automatically copied to a server run by Google, who are legally compelled to provide a copy to the government when subject to a FISA order, it is unclear what Poettering's threat model is here. Handwringing about secure boot is ludicrous when somebody already has a remote backdoor, which all of the cited operating systems do. Frankly, the assertion of such a naked counterfactual says a lot more about Poettering than it does about Linux security.
Just an assumption here, but the project appears to be about the methodology to verify the install. Who holds the keys is an entirely different matter.
The events includes a conference title "Remote Attestation of Imutable Operating Systems built on systemd", which is a bit of a clue.
I'm sure this company is more focused on the enterprise angle, but I wonder if the buildout of support for remote attestation could eventually resolve the Linux gaming vs. anti-cheat stalemate. At least for those willing to use a "blessed" kernel provided by Valve or whoever.
Road to hell is paved with good intentions.
Somebody will use it and eventually force it if it exists and I don't think gaming especially those requiring anti-cheat is worth that risk.
If that means linux will not be able to overtake window's market share, that's ok. At-least the year of the linux memes will still be funny.
Only by creating a new stalemate between essential liberty and a little temporary security — anticheat doesn't protect you from DMA cheating.
I might be behind on the latest counter-counter-counter-measures, but I know some of the leading AC solutions are already using IOMMU to wedge a firewall between passive DMA sniffers and the game processes memory.
e.g. https://support.faceit.com/hc/en-us/articles/19590307650588-...
> resolve the Linux gaming vs. anti-cheat stalemate
It will.
Then just a bit later no movies for you unless you are running a blessed distro. Then Chrome will start reporting to websites that you are this weird guy with a dangerous unlocked distro, so no banking for you. Maybe no government services as well because obviously you are a hacker. Why would you run an unlocked linux if you were not?
rust-vmm-based environment that verifies/authenticates an image before running ? Immutable VM (no FS, root dropper after setting up network, no or curated device), 'micro'-vm based on systemd ? vmm captures running kernel code/memory mapping before handing off to userland, checks periodically it hasn't changed ? Anything else on the state of the art of immutable/integrity-checking of VMs?
Sounds like kernel mode DRM or some similarly unwanted bullshit.
We all know who controls the keys. It's the first party who puts their hands on the device.
And once you remove the friction for requiring cryptographic verification of each component, all it takes is one well-resourced lobby to pass a law either banning user-controlled signing keys outright or relegating them to second-class status. All governments share broadly similar tendencies; the EU and UK govts have always coveted central control over user devices.
Doesn't have to be. While I'm not a fan of systemd (my comment history is there), I want to start from a neutral PoV, and see what it does.
I have my reservations, ideas, and what it's supposed to do, but this is not a place to make speculations and to break spirits.
I'll put my criticism out politely when it's time.
> Sounds like kernel mode DRM or some similarly unwanted bullshit.
Look, I hate systemd just as much as the next guy - but how are you getting "DRM" out of this?
"cryptographically verifiable integrity" is a euphemism for tivoization/Treacherous Computing. See, e.g., https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.en.html
As the immediate responder to this comment, I claim to be the next guy. I love systemd.
I don't like few pieces and Mr. Lennarts attitude to some bugs/obvious flaws, but by far much better than old sysv or really any alternative we have.
Doing complex flows like "run app to load keys from remote server to unlock encrypted partition" is far easier under systemd and it have dependency system robust enough to trigger that mount automatically if app needing it starts
There are genuine positive applications for remote attestation. E.g., if you maintain a set of servers, you can verify that it runs the software it should be running (the software is not compromised). Or if you are running something similar to Apple's Private Compute Cloud to run models, users can verify that it is running the privacy-preserving image that it is claiming to be running.
There are also bad forms of remote attestation (like Google's variant that helps them let banks block you if you are running an alt-os). Those suck and should be rejected.
Edit: bri3d described what I mean better here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46785123
> Remote attestation is literally a form of DRM
Let's say I accept this statement.
What makes you think trusted boot == remote attestation?
> Secure boot and attestation both generally require a form of DRM.
They literally don't.
For a decade, I worked on secure boot & attestation for a device that was both:
- firmware updatable - had zero concept or hardware that connected it to anything that could remotely be called a network
No, it's not "all applications of cryptography". It's only remote attestation.
Buddy, if I want encryption of my own I've got secure boot, LUKS, GPG, etc. With all of those, why would I need or even want remote attestation? The purpose of that is to assure corporations that their code is running on my computer without me being able to modify it. It's for DRM.
Verifiable to who? Some remote third party that isn't me? The hell would I want that?