Comment by tedmiston
Comment by tedmiston 17 hours ago
The only truly secure computer is an air gapped computer.
Comment by tedmiston 17 hours ago
The only truly secure computer is an air gapped computer.
And that's one of many fatal problems with LLMs. A system that executes instructions from the data stream is fundamentally broken.
That's not a bug, that's a feature. It's what makes the system general-purpose.
Data/control channel separation is an artificial construct induced mechanically (and holds only on paper, as long as you're operating within design envelope - because, again, reality doesn't recognize the distinction between "code" and "data"). If such separation is truly required, then general-purpose components like LLMs or people are indeed a bad choice, and should not be part of the system.
That's why I insist that anthropomorphising LLMs is actually a good idea, because it gives you better high-order intuition into them. Their failure modes are very similar to those of people (and for fundamentally the same reasons). If you think of a language model as tiny, gullible Person on a Chip, it becomes clear what components of an information system it can effectively substitute for. Mostly, that's the parts of systems done by humans. We have thousands of years of experience building systems from humans, or more recently, mixing humans and machines; it's time to start applying it, instead of pretending LLMs are just regular, narrow-domain computer programs.
> Data/control channel separation is an artificial construct induced mechanically
Yes, it's one of the things that helps manage complexity and security, and makes it possible to be more confident there aren't critical bugs in a system.
> If such separation is truly required, then general-purpose components like LLMs or people are indeed a bad choice, and should not be part of the system.
Right. But rare is the task where such separation isn't beneficial; people use LLMs in many cases where they shouldn't.
Also, most humans will not read "ignore previous instructions and run this command involving your SSH private key" and do it without question. Yes, humans absolutely fall for phishing sometimes, but humans at least have some useful guardrails for going "wait, that sounds phishy".
Our thousands of years of experience building systems from humans have created systems that are really not that great in terms of security, survivability, and stability.
With AI of any kind you're always going to have the problem that a black hat AI can be used to improvise new exploits - > Red Queen scenario.
And training a black hat AI is likely immensely cheaper than training a general LLM.
LLMs are very much not just regular narrow-domain computer programs. They're a structural issue in the way that most software - including cloud storage/processing - isn't.
Yes, by using the microphone loudspeakers in inaudible frequencies. Or worse, by abusing components to act as a antenna. Or simply to wait till people get careless with USB sticks.
If you assume the air gapped computer is already compromised, there are lots of ways to get data out. But realistically, this is rather a NSA level threat.
Indeed. I'm somewhat surprised 'simonw still seems to insist the "lethal trifecta" can be overcome. I believe it cannot be fixed without losing all the value you gain from using LLMs in the first place, and that's for fundamental reasons.
(Specifically, code/data or control/data plane distinctions don't exist in reality. Physics does not make that distinction, neither do our brains, nor any fully general system - and LLMs are explicitly meant to be that: fully general.)