Comment by thdxr 20 hours ago
hey maintainer here
we've done a poor job handling these security reports, usage has grown rapidly and we're overwhelmed with issues
we're meeting with some people this week to advise us on how to handle this better, get a bug bounty program funded and have some audits done
If part of the problem was that no one was responding to a vulnerability report then a bug bounty program would potentially address that.
you just get spammed with the same three fake reports over and over
Triage is something that these services provide, exactly to deal with that.
My original message was more positive but after more looking into context, I am a bit more pessimistic.
Now I must admit though that I am little concerned by the fact that the vulnerability reporters tried multiple times to contact you but till no avail. This is not a good look at all and I hope you can fix it asap as you mention
I respect dax from the days of SST framework but this is genuinely such a bad look especially when they Reported on 2025-11-17, and multiple "no responses" after repeated attempts to contact the maintainers...
Sure they reported the bug now but who knows what could have / might have even been happening as OpenCode was the most famous open source coding agent and surely more cybersec must have watched it, I can see a genuine possibility where something must have been used in the wild as well from my understanding from black hat adversaries
I think this means that we should probably run models in gvisor/proper sandboxing efforts.
Even right now, we don't know how many more such bugs might persist and can lead to even RCE.
Dax, This short attention would make every adversary look for even more bugs / RCE vulnerabilities right now as we speak so you only have a very finite time in my opinion. I hope things can be done as fast as possible now to make OpenCode more safer.
the email they found was from a different repo and not monitored. this is ultimately our fault for not having a proper SECURITY.md on our main repository
the issue that was reported was fixed as soon as we heard about it - going through the process of learning about the CVE process, etc now and setting everything up correctly. we get 100s of issues reported to us daily across various mediums and we're figuring out how to manage this
i can't really say much beyond this is my own inexperience showing
Also consider putting a security.txt[0] file on your main domain, like here: https://opencode.ai/.well-known/security.txt
I also just want to sympathize with the difficulty of spotting the real reports from the noise. For a time I helped manage a bug bounty program, and 95% of issues were long reports with plausible titles that ended up saying something like "if an attacker can access the user's device, they can access the user's device". Finding the genuine ones requires a lot of time and constant effort. Though you get a feel for it with experience.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security.txt
edit: I agree with the original report that the CORS fix, while a huge improvement, is not sufficient since it doesn't protect from things like malicious code running locally or on the network.
edit2: Looks like you've already rolled out a password! Kudos.
I've been thinking about using LLMs to help triage security vulnerabilities.
If done in an auditably unlogged environment (with a limited output to the company, just saying escalate) it might also encourage people to share vulns they are worried about putting online.
Does that make sense from your experience?
[1] https://github.com/eb4890/echoresponse/blob/main/design.md
Thanks for providing additional context. I appreciate the fact that you are admitting fault where it is and that's okay because its human to make errors and I have full faith from your response that OpenCode will learn from its errors.
I might try OpenCode now once its get patched or after seeing the community for a while. Wishing the best of luck for a more secure future of opencode!
I learnt this the hard way: if anyone is sending multiple emails, with seemingly very important titles and messages, and they get no reply at all, the receiver likely haven’t received your email rather than completely ghosting you. Everyone should know this, and at least try a different channel of communication before further actions, especially from those disclosing vulnerability.
Fixed? You just change it to be off by default giving the security burden to your users. It's not fixed it's buried with minimal mitigation and you give no indication to your users that it will make your machine vulnerable if activated. Shady.
Actually as of v1.1.15 it is fixed: https://github.com/anomalyco/opencode/releases/tag/v1.1.15
I am also baffled at how long this vulnerability was left open, but I’m glad you’re at least making changes to hopefully avoid such mistakes in the future.
Just a thought, have you tried any way to triage these reported issues via LLMs, or constantly running an LLM to check the codebase for gaping security holes? Would that be in any way useful?
Anyway, thanks for your work on opencode and good luck.
Why not just ask Claude to fix the security issues and make sure they don't happen again?
There goes my discord side hustle, offering Claude code through your OpenCode.
I've been curious how this project will grow over time, it seems to have taken the lead as the first open source terminal agent framework/runner, and definitely seems to be growing faster than any organization would/could/should be able to manage.
It really seems like the main focus of the project should be in how to organize the work of the project, rather than on the specs/requirements/development of the codebase itself.
What are the general recommendations the team has been getting for how to manage the development velocity? And have you looked into various anarchist organizational principles?
Good luck, and thank you for eating the accountability sandwich and being up front about what you're doing. That's not always easy to do, and it's appreciated!
I don't understand what is being encouraged here.
Something is seriously wrong when we say "hey, respect!" to a company who develops an unauthenticated RCE feature that should glaringly shine [0] during any internal security analysis, on software that they are licensing in exchange for money [1], and then fumble and drop the ball on security reports when someone does their due diligence for them.
If this company wants to earn any respect, they need at least to publish their post-mortem about how their software development practices allowed such a serious issue to reach shipping.
This should come as a given, especially seeing that this company already works on software related to security (OpenAuth [2]).
[0] https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/ - https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/A06_2025-Insecure_Design/ - https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/A01_2025-Broken_Access_Control/ - https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/A05_2025-Injection/
Honestly RCE here is in the browser. Why the browser executes any code in sight and this code can do anything?
It's called "the world wide web" and it works on the principle that a webpage served by computer A can contain links that point to other pages served by computer B.
Whether that principle should have been sustained in the special case of "B = localhost" is a valid question. I think the consensus from the past 40 years has been "yes", probably based on the amount of unknown failure possibilities if the default was reversed to "no".
Don't waste your time and money on funding bug bounties or "getting audits done". Your staff will add another big security flaw just the next day, back to square one.
Spend that money in reorganizing your management and training your staff so that everyone in your company is onboard with https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/A06_2025-Insecure_Design/ .