Counter Galois Onion: Improved encryption for Tor circuit traffic
(blog.torproject.org)75 points by wrayjustin 8 days ago
75 points by wrayjustin 8 days ago
Relays can be malicious and try to tamper with the data. Think of Tor relay encryption like Signal's E2E encryption, where the relays are analogous to Signal's servers. You want to ensure they can neither see what you sent (confidentiality) nor modify it without detection (integrity).
broadly yes, but the real question is: what's your threat model? https://ssd.eff.org/glossary/threat-model
What you'd do is that you'd write a distributed remailer where fixed-size messages are sent on fixed timeslots, possibly with some noise in when it's transmitted, with a message always being sent on its timeslot, even if a dummy message must be sent.
I've been writing a system like this in Erlang, intended to be short enough that you can take a picture of the source code and then type it in by hand in a reasonable amount of time, as a sort of protest against Chat Control. I'm not sure I'm going to release it-- after all, they haven't passed it yet, and there are all sorts of problems that this thing could needlessly accelerate, but I've started fiddling with it more intensively recently.
I'm not sure. Freenet actually stores information, this is pure communication system. I don't think it uses dummy messages.
My target size is also <500 lines, and I think <200 is feasible, whereas Freenet is apparently 192,000 lines.
Quantum isn’t the problem. Majority-internet telemetry is.
> Of course, we need to make sure that the data isn't modified on the way from the client.
Why is this necessary if every layer of the onion is a trustable encrypted link?