Comment by geoctl

Comment by geoctl 19 hours ago

51 replies

While WireGuard makes every sense for an FPGA due to its minimal design, I wonder why there isn't much interest in using QUIC as a modern tunneling protocol, especially for corporate use cases. QUIC already provides an almost complete WireGuard-alternative via its datagrams that can be easily combined with TUN devices and custom authentication schemes (e.g. mTLS, bearer tokens obtained via OAuth2 and OIDC authentication, etc...) to build your own VPN. While I am not sure about performance, at least when compared to kernel-mode WireGuard, since QUIC is obviously a more complex state machine that's running in userspace and it depends on the implementation and optimizations offered by the OS (e.g. GRO/GSO), QUIC isn't just a yet another tunneling protocol, it actually offers lots of benefits such as working well with dynamic endpoints with DNS instead of just using static IP addrs, it uses modern TLSv1.3 and therefore it's compliant with FIPS for example, it uses AES which can be accelerated by the underlying hardware (e.g. AES-NI), it currently has implementations in almost every major programming language, it can work well in the future with proxies and load balancers, you can bring your own custom, more fine-grained authentication scheme (e.g. bearer tokens, mTLS, etc...), it masquerades as just another QUIC/HTTP3 traffic that's used by almost all major websites now and therefore less susceptible to dropping by any nodes in between, and other less obvious benefits such as congestion control and PMTUD.

sugarpimpdorsey 12 hours ago

Why would anyone want to use a complex kludge like QUIC and be at the mercy of broken TLS libraries, when Wireguard implementations are ~ 5k LOC and easily auditable?

Have all the bugs in OpenSSL over the years taught us nothing?

  • alphazard an hour ago

    QUIC allows identities to be signing keys, which are used to build public key infrastructure. You need to be able to sign things to do web-of-trust, or make arbitrary attestations.

    Wireguard has a concept of identity as long term key pairs, but since the algorithm is based on Diffie-Hellman, and arriving at a shared secret ephemeral key, it's only useful for establishing active connections. The post-quantum version of Wireguard would use KEMs, which also don't work for general purpose PKI.

    What we really need is a signature based handshake and simple VPN solution (like what Wireguard does for the Noise Protocol Framework), that a stream multiplexing protocol can be layered on top of. QUIC gets the layers right, in the right order (first encrypt, then deal with transport features), but annoyingly none of the QUIC implementations make it easy to take one layer without the other.

  • dpeckett 10 hours ago

    FWIW QUIC enforces TLS 1.3 and modern crypto. A lot smaller surface area and far fewer foot-guns. Combined with memory safe TLS implementations in Go and Rust I think it's fair to say things have changed since the heartbleed days.

  • zoobab 7 hours ago

    "Have all the bugs in OpenSSL over the years taught us nothing?"

    TweetNaCL to the rescue.

dpeckett 12 hours ago

I've recently spent a bunch of time working on a mesh networking project that employs CONNECT-IP over QUIC [1].

There's a lot of benefits for sure, mTLS being a huge one (particularly when combined with ACME). For general purpose, spoke and hub VPN's tunneling over QUIC is a no-brainer. Trivial to combine with JWT bearer tokens etc. It's a neat solution that should be used more widely.

However there are downsides, and those downsides are primarily performance related. For a bunch of reasons, some just including poorly optimized library code, others involving relatively high message parsing/framing/coalescing/fragmenting costs, and userspace UDP overheads. On fat pipes today you'll struggle to get more than a few gbits of throughput @ 1500 MTU (which is plenty for internet browsing for sure).

For fat pipes and hardware/FPGA acceleration use cases, google probably has the most mature approach here with their datacenter transport PSP [2]. Basically a stripped down per flow IPsec. In-kernel IPsec has gotten a lot faster and more scalable in recent years with multicore/multiqueue support [3]. Internal benchmarking still shows IPsec on linux absolutely dominating performance benchmarks (throughput and latency).

For the mesh project we ended up pivoting to a custom offload friendly, kernel bypass (AF_XDP) dataplane inspired by IPsec/PSP/Geneve.

I'm available for hire btw, if you've got an interesting networking project and need a remote Go/Rust developer (contract/freelance) feel free to reach out!

1. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9484.html

2. https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/ann...

3. https://netdevconf.info/0x17/docs/netdev-0x17-paper54-talk-s...

  • keepamovin 12 hours ago

    Is quic related to the Chrome implemented WebTransport? Seems pretty cool to have that in browser API.

    • dpeckett 11 hours ago

      Now that's an interesting, and wild, idea.

      I don't believe you could implement RFC 9484 directly in the browser (missing capsule apis would make upgrading the connection not possible). Though WebTransport does support datagrams so you could very well implement something custom.

AnthonyMouse 19 hours ago

The purpose of Wireguard is to be simple. The purpose of QUIC is to be compatible with legacy web junk. You don't use the second one unless you need the second one.

  • geoctl 18 hours ago

    QUIC isn't really about the web, it's more of a TCP+TLS replacement on top of UDP. You can build your own custom L7 on top of QUIC.

    • AnthonyMouse 9 hours ago

      QUIC uses Web PKI and TLS. TLS is not a simple protocol and the main reason to use it over something simpler is if you need it to be compatible with something else that already uses it, like HTTPS.

    • bb88 17 hours ago

      You can build a custom L7 on top of anything, really. I think my favorite was tcp/ip over printers and webcams.

      The question is what does QUIC get you that UDP alone does not? I don't know the answer to that. Is it because firewalls understand it better than native wireguard over UDP packets?

      • zamadatix 16 hours ago

        Mostly because WireGuard (intentionally) didn't bother with obfuscation https://www.wireguard.com/known-limitations/

        > WireGuard does not focus on obfuscation. Obfuscation, rather, should happen at a layer above WireGuard, with WireGuard focused on providing solid crypto with a simple implementation. It is quite possible to plug in various forms of obfuscation, however.

        This comment https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45562302 goes into a practical example of QUIC being that "layer above WireGuard" which gets plugged in. Once you have that, one may naturally wonder "why not also have an alternative tunnelling protocol with <the additional things built into QUIC originally listed> without the need to also layer Wireguard under it?".

        Many design decisions are in direct opposition to Wireguard's design. E.g. Wireguard (intentionally) has no AES and no user selectable ciphers (both intentionally), QUIC does. Wireguard has no obfuscation built in, QUIC does (+ the happy fact when you obfuscate traffic by using it then it looks like standard web traffic). Wireguard doesn't support custom authentication schemes, QUIC does. Both are a reasonable tunneling protocol design, just with different goals.

      • remexre 16 hours ago

        Encryption and reliable transport.

    • nine_k 17 hours ago

      Where is DNS on top of QUIC? Asking unironically.

      • geoctl 16 hours ago

        There is actually. A way more interesting re-implementation of a popular L7 is SSH over QUIC. SSH has to implement its own mutual authentication and transport embedded in the protocol implementation since it operates on top of plaintext TCP, but with QUIC you can just offload the authentication (e.g. JWT bearer tokens issued by IdPs verified at L7 or automatically via mTLS x509 certs) and transport parts to QUIC and therefore have a much more minimal implementation.

      • maxloh 12 hours ago

        It is already there. It is called DNS over HTTP/3 (DoH3).

  • johncolanduoni 14 hours ago

    What legacy junk is QUIC compatible with? It doesn’t include anything HTTP-related at all. It’s just an encrypted transport layer.

    • mlhpdx 14 hours ago

      It’s multi stream, reliable connections. WireGuard’s encryption over UDP is none of those things. WireGuard encryption is simpler and far more flexible, but also less capable.

riobard 3 hours ago

The assumed mentality of “being flexible” is the very reason WireGuard was created to fight against in the first place, otherwise why bother? IPSec is already standardized and with wide-spread hardware implementation (both FPGA and ASIC) and flexible.

HackerThemAll 5 hours ago

Why are you taking from people their will to experiment and design new stuff? Are they using your money or time? Is this just out of grumpiness, envy, condescension or what?

azalemeth 19 hours ago

Mullvad offers exactly the combination of wireguard in QUIC for obsfucation and to make traffic look like Https -- https://mullvad.net/en/blog/introducing-quic-obfuscation-for...

  • geoctl 19 hours ago

    WireGuard-over-QUIC does not make any sense to me, this lowers performance and possibly the inner WireGuard MTUs. You can just replace WireGuard with QUIC altogether if you just want obfuscation.

    • nine_k 17 hours ago

      It's not about performance, of course. It's about looking like HTTPS, being impenetrable, separating the ad-hoc transport encryption and the Wireguard encryption which also works as authentication between endpoints, and also not being not TCP inside TCP.

      • geoctl 17 hours ago

        You can just do that by using QUIC-based tunneling directly instead of using WireGuard-over-QUIC and basically stacking 2 state machines on top of one another.

    • sauercrowd 17 hours ago

      Probably simplifies their clients and backends I'd imagine?

wmf 19 hours ago

I think standards operate according to punctuated equilibrium so the market will only accept one new standard every ten years or so. I could imagine something like PQC causing a shift to QUIC in the future.

smolder 12 hours ago

Quic is a corporate supported black hole. Corporations are anti-human. Its a wonder that there is still some freedom to make useful protocols on the internet and that people are nice enough to do that

ohdeardear 8 hours ago

I think with a comment like this you have absolutely no clue what is relevant for adoption.

Adoption is about offering something that is 1) correct 2) easy to install 3) has reasonable performance 4) stable.

Wireguard provides all of those. OpenVPN was not meeting criterium 1 even a few years ago and IMO, if it doesn't work after a decade of development, it's _never_ going to work.

Now, let's look at your comment, which is full of techno mumbo jumbo (don't worry, I know everything you talk about), doesn't even mention half of those.

I think an extremely naive, but popular position is that when someone comes out with some new tool that "works on their machine", that they assume that everyone else believes immediately that they are not just as stupid as everyone that came before them. This was even true for Wireguard, since Wireguard was _not_ bug free either. In fact, one could argue that Wireguard is still an amateur project despite it working stable for some of my systems.

The problem with software like Wireguard is that there is no incentive to actually make bug free software. If software always works and has all the required features, nobody will call the person or company associated with it anymore. When was the last time that the author of "grep" was recognized as a great programmer? Never. Now, I am not saying that grep is free of bugs, but I just took a fairly stable program as an example. An economy for software like SaaS has much better incentives in that regard (even though they often also do not reach bug free status). curl is also an excellent example of bug ridden software that an entire industry is using, while it is written by an amateur (that has no incentive whatsoever to produce something that doesn't need to have bugs fixed).

If humanity had somewhat more of a collective intelligence, a million people would come together and just all paid $100 to implement a wireguard replacement (possibly even using the same protocol) to perfection such that no new implementation would ever be needed and that would adapt to any hardware automatically. Instead we prefer to continue to fuck around with inferior shit all day long.

  • philipallstar 6 hours ago

    > When was the last time that the author of "grep" was recognized as a great programmer? Never.

    Ken Thompson wrote grep, and he is definitely recognised as such.

    • ohdeardear 6 hours ago

      man -T grep | grep 'Free Soft\|Thom'

        (Cop)108 348 Q(yright 1998-2000, 2002, 2005-2023 Free Softw)-.1 E(are F)
      
      Sure, he wrote _a_ version of grep, and probably the first, but who cares? "The" (sure, you might run some bsd grep) current version of grep certainly doesn't.
      • jacquesm 4 hours ago

        No, he wrote grep. Before he wrote it there was no grep. And yes, he's recognized as a great programmer. With Multics, Unix, B, C, UTF-8 Plan9, Inferno and grep to his name (and probably others that I forgot) he has more than deserved that.

        Future grep versions, including the FSF one, were all re-implementations.

        Your statement in the GP is nonsensical.

      • philipallstar an hour ago

        I'm just saying this is incorrect:

        > When was the last time that the author of "grep" was recognized as a great programmer? Never.

        He is recognised as that. Your opinion on him is nothing to do with anything.