Comment by greenie_beans
Comment by greenie_beans 3 days ago
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Comment by greenie_beans 3 days ago
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No, what prompted me to say you don't understand LVT was the suggestion there needs to be some determination of what the "highest use" is.
Yes, if you hold land in a place where a lot of people around you (and/or the state) is investing in economic development, your carrying cost will increase and the ultimate goal is for you not to be able to extract uncapped gains from the appreciation that people around you are generating.
> you will raise taxes on their now-high value urban SFH because they aren't producing anything (aka "fully utilized")
This is the type of statement that makes me suspect again you do not understand LVT. You don't raise taxes because they aren't producing anything. The tax goes up as the value of the land goes up as already occurs with property taxes. The only difference is that if you decide to build a second house on your property, your taxes would not go up under LVT, whereas under the current property tax regime, it would go up dramatically. This has the net effect of incentivizing people to fully utilize their land, but does not require any determination of their utilization nor does it "raise taxes" on them for failing to utilize.
> like you said, it's a neutral shift. if the cost of the property goes down because of a higher tax, then it's a neutral shift
This is not what's described by "neutral." It's neutral because right now your property tax is already both an LVT and a tax on the improvements. LVT would increase the LVT component and decrease the improvement component.
If the introduction of LVT reduces the value of a property, then it would accordingly reduce the carrying cost of that property. Your two variables are mutually exclusive under a revenue-neutral scheme.
you're contradicting yourself. you say it's "revenue neutral" but then admit people in areas with rising land values face higher carrying costs. that's exactly the displacement i'm describing.
your clarification on mechanics doesn't address my core concern: this policy forces people who bought affordable homes decades ago to either pay significantly more or sell when their neighborhoods gentrify. who benefits when they're forced to sell? developers who can afford both the LVT and development costs.
so we're transferring wealth from middle-class homeowners to wealthy developers and calling it progressive policy.
frame this as preventing "uncapped gains from appreciation," but these are people who just needed housing, not speculators. meanwhile, actual investors get to buy the forced sales.
you still haven't addressed how LVT solves the actual constraint. in my market, a major developer cancelled a project because of constructions cost. not land value. if land availability isn't the bottleneck, how does your policy help? construction costs are the real issue in most markets.
this remains a policy that sounds elegant in theory but would be politically impossible and harmful in practice.
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