Comment by csb6
Comment by csb6 2 days ago
> Every moral duty is owed to a real, identifiable someone. You can’t have a duty to “a possible person” who does not yet exist.
This doesn’t hold up. It is effectively denying that people will be born in the future, which of course they will be since antinatalism is not universal and fertility rates are above zero. There are valuable things that can be done today that will help those people but not anyone alive today (e.g. preservation of media that is well-known and widely distributed today but may not be in the future when it is more historically valuable).
It is safe to assume that new people will be born at some point in the future (given current conditions) and will then be “identifiable”, so you have to account for their future existences when making moral decisions with future consequences.
I'm not arguing against the moral duty of making the future better for those that are created in the future, I agree with that perspective.
I only try to enhance the argument that there is no moral duty to create them.
Moral value is for those who exist, and given that we know more will come to exist, even though their creation itself is (in my view) morally negative, it does not conflict with acknowledging that they will, and to make the world as good as possible for them.