Comment by neilv
> On Tuesday morning, August 8th, the public-affairs department of Citibank, Citicorp's chief subsidiary, put out the long-delayed press release. In language as bland as a loan officer's wardrobe, the three-paragraph document said unnamed "engineers who designed the building" had recommended that "certain of the connections in Citicorp Center's wind bracing system be strengthened through additional welding." The engineers, the press release added, "have assured us that there is no danger." When DeFord expanded on the handout in interviews, he portrayed the bank as a corporate citizen of exemplary caution -- "We wear both belts and suspenders here," he told a reporter for the News -- that had decided on the welds as soon as it learned of new data based on dynamic-wind tests conducted at the University of Western Ontario.
> There was some truth in all this. [...] At the time, LeMessurier viewed this piece of information as one more nail in the coffin of his career, but later, recognizing it as a blessing in disguise, he passed it on to Citicorp as the possible basis of a cover story for the press and for tenants in the building.
Seems questionable to lie to conceal that kind of catastrophic risk.
Knowing that the skyscraper would fail in some kinds of winds is information that could be used by rational people to help protect themselves and their businesses.
> Shortly before dawn on Friday, September 1st, weather services carried the news that everyone had been dreading—a major storm, Hurricane Ella, was off Cape Hatteras and heading for New York. At 6:30 a.m., an emergency-planning group convened at the command center in Robertson's office. "Nobody said, ‘We're probably going to press the panic button,' " LeMessurier recalls. "Nobody dared say that. But everybody was sweating blood."
> As the storm bore down on the city, the bank's representatives, DeFord and Dexter, asked LeMessurier for a report on the status of repairs. He told them that the most critical joints had already been fixed and that the building, with its tuned mass damper operating, could now withstand a two-hundred-year storm. It didn't have to, however. A few hours later, Hurricane Ella veered from its northwesterly course and began moving out to sea.
I see gambling people.
Presumably, some were gambling to avoid temporary public disorder in the city, or temporary disruption to general commerce there.
But it sounds like others of them wanted cover up a scandal in which they and the company were now implicated. And they were willing to gamble with other people's lives and businesses to do so.
You seem awfully quick to indict them. While honesty is definitely a virtue, too much can hurt. They wanted to avoid causing a panic, and they monitored risk carefully. Presumably they had time to issue evacuation orders in the event the storm turned towards the city. In the end they completed the repairs and no one had to panic.
Compare that with the evacuation of Fukushima after the incident at the nuclear plant, which released a very minor amount of radiation. Many people suffered severe psychological stress at not being able to return home and not knowing when or if they'd be allowed to go home. Some to the point of suicide. In that case the issue was more about unnecessary evacuation as opposed to messaging, but the point stands the unnecessary panic can cause real harm.