Comment by fsmv

Maybe he doesn't think consciousness is a computation.

> The computation would be the same.

Assuming of course that Penrose is cuckoo when it comes to consciousness (which I'm happy to assume).

This is a typical critique that sort of assumes you have to be right about everything to be right about anything. Maybe a useful point of comparison is aether theories in physics. Wrong, sure, but useless? People might argue whether it was always pure distraction or a useful building block, but I wonder what Maxwell or Einstein would say. If nothing else, one needs something to ground one's thinking and to argue against, which is why replacement theories usually need to acknowledge or address what came before. And typically we try to fix bad theories rather than simply discarding them, especially if there's no alternative available. What are the other available "grand unifying theories" of consciousness? To quote the end of Aaronson's rebutal:

> In my opinion, the fact that Integrated Information Theory is wrong—demonstrably wrong, for reasons that go to its core—puts it in something like the top 2% of all mathematical theories of consciousness ever proposed. Almost all competing theories of consciousness, it seems to me, have been so vague, fluffy, and malleable that they can only aspire to wrongness.

Of course, it's not on Aaronson to rescue the theory he's trying to disprove, but notice that he is out to disprove it and spends his time on that, rather than imagining what axioms might be added or replaced, etc. Proving that having a large Φ-value is not a sufficient condition for consciousness hardly seems devastating "to the core", because finding better descriptions of necessary conditions would still represent significant progress.

Similarly a critique like

> He thinks that because in CPUs the physical transistors don't have as many connections as neurons in the brain, that it's fundamentally limited and cannot be conscious.

seems a little bit narrow. I do agree it seems to misunderstand universality, but on the other hand, maybe it's just distracted by counting IO pins on chips, and what it should focus on more is counting nodes/edges in neural net layers, and whether connection-counting in hardware-vs-software might need to have a weighting-coeffecients, etc. HN loves to celebrate things like the bitter lesson, the rise of LLMs and ML, and the failure of classical logic and rule-based reasoning and NLP. Is all of that same stuff not soft-evidence for the relevance if not the completeness of IIT?