Comment by nonrandomstring

When I spoke to these guys [0] we touched on those quirks and foibles that make a signature (including TCP stack stuff beyond control of any userspace app).

I love this curl, but I worry that if a component takes on the role of deception in order to "keep up" it accumulates a legacy of hard to maintain "compatibility" baggage.

Ideally it should just say... "hey I'm curl, let me in"

The problem of course lies with a server that is picky about dress codes, and that problem in turn is caused by crooks sneaking in disguise, so it's rather a circular chicken and egg thing.

[0] https://cybershow.uk/episodes.php?id=39

thaumasiotes 9 days ago

> Ideally it should just say... "hey I'm curl, let me in"

What? Ideally it should just say "GET /path/to/page".

Sending a user agent is a bad idea. That shouldn't be happening at all, from any source.

Reply View 3 replies

Tor3 8 days ago

Since the first browser appeared I've always meant that sending a user agent id was a really bad idea. It breaks with the fundamental idea of the web protocol, that it's the server's responsibility to provide data and it's the client's responsibility to present it to the user. The server does not need to know anything about the client. Including user agent in this whole thing was a huge mistake as it allowed web site designers to code for specific quirks in browsers. I can to some extent accept a capability list from the client, but I'm not so sure even that is necessary.

Reply View | 0 replies
nonrandomstring 8 days ago

Absolutely, yes! A protocol should not be tied to client details. Where did "User Agent" strings even come from?

Reply View | 1 reply
- darrenf 8 days ago
  
  They're in the HTTP/1.0 spec. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1945#section-10.15
  10.15 User-Agent
  The User-Agent request-header field contains information about the user agent originating the request. This is for statistical purposes, the tracing of protocol violations, and automated recognition of user agents for the sake of tailoring responses to avoid particular user agent limitations.
  
  Reply View | 0 replies

immibis 9 days ago

What should instead happen is that Chrome should stop sending as much of a fingerprint, so that sites won't be able to fingerprint. That won't happen, since it's against Google's interests.

Reply View 19 replies

gruez 9 days ago

This is a fundamental misunderstanding of how TLS fingerprinting works. The "fingerprint" isn't from chrome sending a "fingerprint: [random uuid]" attribute in every TLS negotiation. It's derived from various properties of the TLS stack, like what ciphers it can accept. You can't make "stop sending as much of a fingerprint", without every browser agreeing on the same TLS stack. It's already minimal as it is, because there's basically no aspect of the TLS stack that users can configure, and chrome bundles its own, so you'd expect every chrome user to have the same TLS fingerprint. It's only really useful to distinguish "fake" chrome users (eg. curl with custom header set, or firefox users with user agent spoofer) from "real" chrome users.

Reply View | 18 replies
- RKFADU_UOFCCLEL 8 days ago
  
  What? Just fix the ciphers to a list of what's known to work + some safety margin. Each user needing some different specific cipher (like a cipher for horses, and one for dogs), is not a thing.
  
  Reply View | 1 reply
  
  gruez 8 days ago
  
  >Just fix the ciphers to a list of what's known to work + some safety margin.
  That's already the case. The trouble is that NSS (what firefox uses) doesn't support the same cipher suites as boringssl (what chrome uses?).
  
  Reply View | 0 replies
- dochtman 9 days ago
  
  Part of the fingerprint is stuff like the ordering of extensions, which Chrome could easily do but AFAIK doesn’t.
  (AIUI Google’s Play Store is one of the biggest TLS fingerprinting culprits.)
  
  Reply View | 15 replies
  
  shiomiru 9 days ago
  
  Chrome has randomized its ClientHello extension order for two years now.[0]
  The companies to blame here are solely the ones employing these fingerprinting techniques, and those relying on services of these companies (which is a worryingly large chunk of the web). For example, after the Chrome change, Cloudflare just switched to a fingerprinter that doesn't check the order.[1]
  [0]: https://chromestatus.com/feature/5124606246518784
  [1]: https://blog.cloudflare.com/ja4-signals/
  
  Reply View | 13 replies
  
  gruez 9 days ago
  
  What's the advantage of randomizing the order, when all chrome users already have the same order? Practically speaking there's a bazillion ways to fingerprint Chrome besides TLS cipher ordering, that it's not worth adding random mitigations like this.
  
  Reply View | 0 replies