Comment by conradev
Timing attacks are notably not a part of Tor's threat model, i.e. they are a real concern: https://support.torproject.org/about/attacks-on-onion-routin...
Timing attacks are notably not a part of Tor's threat model, i.e. they are a real concern: https://support.torproject.org/about/attacks-on-onion-routin...
Mixnet would be a solution. Like what you described, have inbound packets held for some period of time and released as a group so that you cannot as easily correlate the inbound and outbound traffic.
The downside is that it gets much slower, and feels 'bad' as an end user. Each packet takes longer.
hmm. that is interesting , would you mind sharing some solution , what if I add some insane latency (I know unusable but if it prevents timing attacks)
my conspiracy spidey sense is sensing something fishy...
Maybe timing attack is not part of .onion addresses ?