Comment by mrcwinn a day ago
Well gosh, that sentence makes it seems like Congress could do anything!
However, this case is about something else. The opinion states that there is a first amendment interest, but that interest is secondary to a compelling national security interest that, in the court’s view, is valid. That may or may not be correct - but it is a subjective interpretation.
> Yeah, it's the perhaps most powerful clause in the constitution.
Only because the Court wants it to be, so they can play Calvinball.
Marijuana grown, sold, and consumed entirely within one state? Still interstate commerce! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gonzales_v._Raich
The original sin was Wickard, which found a farmer “growing wheat to feed animals on his own farm” was subject to interstate commerce “reduced the amount of wheat he would buy for animal feed on the open market, which is traded nationally, is thus interstate, and is therefore within the scope of the Commerce Clause” [1]. The court even noted that the farmer’s “relatively small amount of production of more wheat than he was allotted would not affect interstate commerce itself,” ruling that “the cumulative actions of thousands of other farmers” acting as he did would.
This seems true… many many thousands of farmers combined consuming their own self grown wheat, would produce noticeable effects on interstate commerce. Specifically wheat markets, futures, etc…
I think the meaning of the commerce clause is pretty explicit in the constitution. The existence of unreasonable interpretations of the commerce clause doesn't change that the commerce clause on it's own, just with a simple reading of it, isn't powerful. Also worth noting that at least one textualist, Justice Thomas, dissented in that case, exactly because of textualism.
Honestly, it seems completely irrelevant that a simple reading of the commerce clause isn't that powerful. What matters is how things are applied, and what precedents have been established. As applied the commerce clause is immensly powerful. As layman we can whinge about how words have been twisted, but in terms of things i can personally influence it means exactly nothing.
Whoops, "doesn't change " should be "doesn't mean." I think the simple reading actually is pretty powerful. It just says "[The Congress shall have Power . . . ] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;" There aren't many qualifiers there except notably intrastate commerce.
> Yeah, it's the perhaps most powerful clause in the constitution
It's worth noting that many conservative lawyers and activists have been calling for a more limited interpretation of interstate commerce, as a way of shifting power away from Congress to individual states.
>that sentence makes it seems like Congress could do anything!
Yeah, it's the perhaps most powerful clause in the constitution. A large number of laws are formed like "[actual law ...] in commerce." That is the hook needed for a lot of laws to be constitutional. Technically those laws only apply to interstate or international commerce.
There are even supreme court cases discussing this:
>Congress uses different modifiers to the word “commerce” in the design and enactment of its statutes. The phrase “affecting commerce” indicates Congress’ intent to regulate to the outer limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause. [...] Considering the usual meaning of the word “involving,” and the pro-arbitration purposes of the FAA, Allied-Bruce held the “word ‘involving,’ like ‘affecting,’ signals an intent to exercise Congress’ commerce power to the full.” Ibid. Unlike those phrases, however, the general words “in commerce” and the specific phrase “engaged in commerce” are understood to have a more limited reach. In Allied-Bruce itself the Court said the words “in commerce” are “oftenfound words of art” [...] The Court’s reluctance to accept contentions that Congress used the words “in commerce” or “engaged in commerce” to regulate to the full extent of its commerce power rests on sound foundation, as it affords objective and consistent significance to the meaning of the words Congress uses when it defines the reach of a statute.[0]
[0] Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/532/105/case.pdf