Comment by chriskanan
Comment by chriskanan a day ago
I have no idea if comments actually have any impact, but here is the comment I left on the document:
I am Christopher Kanan, a professor and AI researcher at the University of Rochester with over 20 years of experience in artificial intelligence and deep learning. Previously, I led AI research and development at Paige, a medical AI company, where I worked on FDA-regulated AI systems for medical imaging. Based on this experience, I would like to provide feedback on the proposed export control regulations regarding compute thresholds for AI training, particularly models requiring 10^26 computational operations.
The current regulation seems misguided for several reasons. First, it assumes that scaling models automatically leads to something dangerous. This is a flawed assumption, as simply increasing model size and compute does not necessarily result in harmful capabilities. Second, the 10^26 operations threshold appears to be based on what may be required to train future large language models using today’s methods. However, future advances in algorithms and architectures could significantly reduce the computational demands for training such models. It is unlikely that AI progress will remain tied to inefficient transformer-based models trained on massive datasets. Lastly, many companies trying to scale large language models beyond systems like GPT-4 have hit diminishing returns, shifting their focus to test-time compute. This involves using more compute to "think" about responses during inference rather than in model training, and the regulation does not address this trend at all.
Even if future amendments try to address test-time compute, the proposed regulation seems premature. There are too many unknowns in future AI development to justify using a fixed compute-based threshold as a reliable indicator of potential risk. Instead of focusing on compute thresholds or model sizes, policymakers should focus on regulating specific high-risk AI applications, similar to how the FDA regulates AI software as a medical device. This approach targets the actual use of AI systems rather than their development, which is more aligned with addressing real-world risks.
Without careful refinement, these rules risk stifling innovation, especially for small companies and academic researchers, while leaving important developments unregulated. I urge policymakers to engage with industry and academic experts to refocus regulations on specific applications rather than broadly targeting compute usage. AI regulation must evolve with the field to remain effective and balanced.
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Of course, I have no skin in the game since I barely have any compute available to me as an academic, but the proposed rules on compute just don't make any sense to me.
This is an appropriate restriction on what will likely be a core part of military technology in the coming decade (eg drone piloting).
Look, if Russia didn't invade Ukraine and China didn't keep saying they wanted to invade Taiwan, I wouldn't have any issues with sending them millions of Blackwell chips. But that's not the world we live in. Unfortunately, this is the foreign policy reality that exists outside of the tech bubble we live in. If China ever wants to drop their ambitions over Taiwan then the export restrictions should be dropped, but not a moment sooner.