Comment by vrtx0

Comment by vrtx0 4 days ago

Thank you! This is exactly the information the OP seems to have missed. It seems to confirm my suspicion that the author’s concerns about server-side privacy are unfounded — I think:

> The client decrypts the reply to its PNNS query, which may contain multiple candidate landmarks. A specialized, lightweight on-device reranking model then predicts the best candidate…

[please correct me if I missed anything — this used to be my field, but I’ve been disabled for 10 years now, so grain of salt]

chikere232 4 days ago

The devil is in the proprietary details though.

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vrtx0 4 days ago

Sorry, what do you mean by “proprietary details”?

Reply View | 3 replies
- sbuk 4 days ago
  
  They are alluding to the fact that the implementation is closed source, and therefore "untrustworthy". It's a trite point, of course, but not without some merit.
  
  Reply View | 2 replies
  
  vrtx0 3 days ago
  
  I don’t see any merit, honestly. That would assume one is able to audit every bit of code they run, including updates, and control the build system.
  I mean, the Wally paper contains enough information to effectively implement homomorphic encryption for similar purposes. The field was almost entirely academic ~12 years ago…
  I miss talking shop on HN. Comments like that are why we can’t have nice things.
  
  Reply View | 1 reply
  
  sbuk 3 days ago
  
  I do agree that everything is politicized. I'd have liked to have seen an explanation for laypeople and perhaps the option being opt-in. To me, there is some merit in that stance. It is a side-note. It is a shame that we can't talk about these things openly without people getting offended because of it.
  
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