Comment by cookiengineer

The issue that TOR has is that it's a layered routing concept that won't respect ASN based spreading/scattering of traffic.

Circuits are temporary but the traffic is not scattered across the network to make MITM fingerprinting of request/payload sizes/timestamps impossible.

A typical MITM like the FBI surveillance van next door can identify you by observing the network packets and by _when_ they were requested and by _how large_ the payloads were. There was a famous court case where this was enough evidence to identify a user of an onion service, without the FBI having access to the Wi-Fi of the user. But they had access to the exit node logs that were encrypted, the pcap logs to the onion service from that exit node, and the encrypted Wi-Fi packets of the user.

(Also TLS lower than 1.3 and SNI related problems are relevant here, because DNS TTL 0 effectively makes everyone's privacy compromised, shame on you if you set a DNS TTL to 0)

My point is that with more randomized hops across the network and across ASNs it would be less likely that a threat actor can control both guard and exit nodes.

(Assuming that they parse RIR datasets to map organizations across ASNs, which the datasets already provide)