Comment by InkCanon
Would it not make the situation worse? The risk/reward of an intervention massively changes when Taiwan is no longer the only source of chips.
Would it not make the situation worse? The risk/reward of an intervention massively changes when Taiwan is no longer the only source of chips.
How china would secure semico advantage by invading Taiwan? Those fabs would be damaged or destroyed
> Those fabs would be damaged or destroyed
> > China is likely to take out the nearby, high quality fab
Yes.
If China's domestic fabs are second best or close --- and China may manage to crawl into this position --- destroying the best fab increases their relative standing and significantly hurts Western security. Whatever crumbs they get from Taiwan (the proportion of expertise that decides to roll over and help, and whatever capital equipment survives to be reverse engineered) are just a bonus.
If China's domestic fabs are not --- because there's a fab tied for first place in North America-- destroying the neighboring fab that they benefit from clearly doesn't benefit them.
So, there's two factors here, that move in opposite directions:
1. China is less likely to secure a semiconductor advantage over the West, if TSMC has a US location. Instead, China is likely to take out the nearby, high quality fab, and whatever they are left with domestically is more likely to be inferior to distant capabilities.
2. Because of #1, China is less likely to secure a massive advantage over the US by invading Taiwan; as a result the US may feel it less likely to support Taiwan.
I'm inclined to think #1 is the more important one. #1 makes the risk of an invasion much higher. #2 makes the reward for an intervention somewhat lower, but I don't think it changes China's calculation of how likely the US is to intervene that much.